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Child poverty is a problem firmly recognized in the industrialized world. In the EU 
nearly one in every five children was poor in 2008 (for the population as a whole the 
risk of poverty was around 17 per cent). The dimension of the problem and its 
consequences point out for the importance of knowing the processes behind it.  
This paper aims to investigate how labour market issues and public policies have been 
impact on child poverty, over recent years. Based on microdata gathered by the 
European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU_SILC) for the period 
2004-08 we give a portrait of child income poverty in European Southern countries such 
as: Italy, Portugal and Spain and also in Poland. Moreover, we investigate the major 
changes in social policies that could impact on child poverty such benefits target on 
family and child allowances.  
The international comparison will allow the identification of children’s poverty profile 
and pattern across the countries analysed and also design the different compositions 
between labour market elements / public policies in such countries. This exercise of 
comparison also enables a first test of the efficiency of these policies.  
The methodological framework used varies from descriptive methods to econometric 
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Child poverty is a problem worldwide recognized and its reduction is a social priority1. 
According to the statistics of EUROSTAT, in the EU almost one in every five children is 
poor, which means deficits in material well-being for children and cost for the society as 
a whole2. 
Despite the social policies that have been applied so far the problem of child poverty 
still stick out, questioning the design of the measures undertaken.  The role of social 
transfers intended to reinforce family’s resources has been quite weak. Moreover, the 
importance of child poverty within non-working parents points out the importance of 
labour market issues on child poverty3.  
In this paper we intend to analyze the impact of work and social transfers  on child 
poverty in South-European countries, such as: Italy, Portugal and Spain and also in an 
emerge European economy – Poland, in order to investigate how different social 
policies designs and work conditions have been impact on child poverty in recent years. 
Based on data gathered by European Statistics on Income and Living Conditions – 
EU_SILC – for the period 2004-08, we assess the extent to which child poverty trends 
have been associated to social transfers and parent’s work conditions, during the period 
under study.  
The paper is organized as follows: after this introductory section we analyze child 
poverty trends in section 2. Than we describe the government interventions in the four 
economies intended to ensure a minimum level of resources to families, in the third 
section. In section 4 we investigate the impact of social transfers on child poverty. 
Finally in the fifth section, we conclude by discussing the interactions between child 




1. Child poverty trends 
 
The definition and measurement of poverty has been widely discussed4 in terms of the 
concepts used - to define who is poor - and in terms of the indicators considered - to 
evaluate poverty. In this paper the definition of poverty used comes from the monetary 
approach to this problem. Upon the observation of household’s resources we define a 
poverty line that defines individuals as poor or non-poor. This methodology includes 
some important issues that need to be detailed.  
The first issue to be specified is the resource variable used. Taking into account the 
statistical availability and accuracy of annual household income, this is the resource 
variable adopted. As our unit of analysis is the individual, in investigating child poverty 
we have to impute income to the child, which calls for the second issue to be discussed.  
In fact household income is strongly associated with children’s life conditions and, 
therefore, with child wellbeing. To impute income to the child we consider that 
household resources are equally shared within family members5. To take into account 
different household compositions we apply the OCDE modified equivalence scale 
which is the basis for calculating income per equivalent adult. The individual is the unit 
of observation and the household is the unit of measurement. The identification of the 
poor is based upon the calculation of a poverty line, defined as 60 per cent of median 
income per equivalent adult6.  
Finally, the third issue concerns the quantification of poverty. Several authors consider 
that the measurement of poverty should give information about the incidence, the 
intensity and the inequality of the problem.7 In this paper we only consider the head-
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count ratio, calculated with and without different types of social transfers, in order to 
analyse the effect of social policy on child poverty, one of the two aims of this paper.  
To go further in the analysis of child poverty, we explore the incidence of poverty 
according to demographic and social attributes. The demographic breakdowns 
considered are: sex, age and family composition. The social breakdowns adopted are: 
parent’s profession category, number of worked hours on the main activity, employment 
sector and type of contract. These desegregations capture the impact of work issues on 
child poverty, the other aim of this paper. 
Finally and in order to design the profile of child poverty in each of the four countries 
analyzed we use logit models to: evaluate the impact of the different demographic and 
social attributes on child poverty odds and, to seek for inter-country differences.  This 
methodology reinforces the empirical analysis and enables inferential purposes, giving 
important insights to policy design.  
Data used comes from the European Statistics on Income and Living Conditions - 
EU_SILC – for the period 2004-08 for Italy, Portugal, Poland and Spain. These data 
enables a portrait of child poverty and a discussion of social policies in South European 
countries and also in a new state member – Poland. 
Our empirical analysis includes three stages: first we investigate child poverty trends 
according to the demographic attributes considered, then we apply this analysis to the 
social breakdowns adopted and finally, we analyse the profile of child poverty in the 
four countries trough econometric techniques.  
Demographic attributes 
Globally speaking, women seem to be more affected by poverty than man, except in 
Poland where the difference between the poverty headcount by sex is meaningless (table 
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1A8). This is also the case for children (see table 2A), except in Portugal where the 
proportion of poor boys is 30 per cent higher than the corresponding for girls. 
Nevertheless, gender seems not having impact on poverty incidence which does not 
mean that this difference does not exist in particular subpopulations9. 
The analysis of poverty by age is very important in what concerns child poverty. In fact 
this analysis, by giving the relative position of children in terms of poverty, acts as the 
starting point in the investigation of the effect of work and public policies in poverty 
among children - the aim of this paper. 
Figure 1 and table 2A, show important features of child poverty across the four 
countries under analysis, during the period 2004-08: children were particularly at risk in 
Poland, despite the positive evolution on child poverty rates, they were always the 
group with the highest incidence of poverty; this is also the case for Italy, despite the 
fact that incidence of child poverty did not vary significantly during this period; in 
Portugal and in Spain the elderly stand out, but in 2008 children were the most 
vulnerable group to poverty in Portugal, in line with the other two countries. 
 
[figure 1, here] 
 
 
Family dimension (see tables 1A and 2A) seems to be directly associated with poverty 
for all and especially for children, as the incidence of poverty grows with the number of 
individuals in the family. However one note should be made for one individual families: 
in all countries except in Poland they also experience significant rates of poverty which 
may suggest a different feature of this type of families in this countries compared to the 
South European analysed.  
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Concerning family composition, single parenthood families and families with two adults 
and three or more children stand out as the most vulnerable to poverty in all four 
countries. This is most significant within children which call for specific attention to 
these families in the context of child poverty.  
Table 2A shows, on the one hand, that in 2005 this scenario was most significant un 
Poland than in the other three countries and, on the other hand, that in 2008 Spain was 
the country with the higher proportion of poor children in these typologies and also the 
country with the worst evolution of this indicator in these families. 
 
Social attributes 
According to the aims of this paper the social attributes considered are related to 
parent’s work context: profession’s category, number of worked hours, employment 
sector and type of contract. The first issue to be analyzed concerns the relation between 
unemployment and poverty in order to have a first glance on how social protection to 
unemployed persons was able to avoid poverty. As it would be expected the incidence 
of poverty is much higher within unemployment situations. However we should be 
aware for the fact that this is particularly truth for children in all the four countries. 
Although, with different magnitude. 
Figure 2 and tables 3A and 4A clearly show two important findings: there had been a 
positive evolution of child poverty rates within families with unemployment problems 
in all the four countries despite the fact that in Italy and in Poland more than half of the 
children included in these families still poor in 2008. Does this mean that the social 
protection to unemployment is more effective in Portugal and in Spain? We will return 




[figure 2, here] 
 
 
With unemployment child poverty rates are high, but what happens in the opposite 
situations i.e. with full time employment? First, one important finding should be point 
out: the self-employed and in special the one without employees, show higher rates of 
poverty than the employee (tables 3A and 4A). This is particularly evident in Poland 
where the incidence of poverty of employees is less than half the corresponding for the 
self-employee. Is the importance of the public sector behind this result? Secondly it 
should be mentioned that being a full time employee seems to avoid less poverty for 
children as the incidence of child poverty is always higher than the corresponding for 
the whole population, especially in Spain. This result underlines the importance of 
employment in tackling the problem of child poverty.  
If being employed is important in preventing poverty the number of working hours and 
the type of contract also matter (see tables 3A and 4A). Again this seems to be 
particularly important for children. In what concerns the number of working hours, the 
association with poverty rates is not linear. In fact, globally speaking, individuals with 
45 or more working hours weekly show higher incidences of poverty, which may be 
explained by the kind of work and qualification level that they generally have. 
Nevertheless and in line with the previous conclusions within profession’s category, the 
common eight-hours-day-work seems to have the strongest impact in avoiding poverty 
which calls again for the importance of employment policies in combating poverty and, 
especially, child poverty.  
Finally and also in line with the previous analysis, the type of contract also impacts on 
poverty incidence and, again, this is more important within children, in all the four 
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countries. Table 4A shows that temporary work is associated with higher rates in child 
poverty, especially in Poland and in Italy, despite the positive evolution of these rates 
between 2005 and 2008 which was not the case in Portugal and in Spain. May this trend 
be a signal of the economic crisis that deeply affects Portugal and Spain?  
 
Child poverty profile 
 
The first model estimated considers the pooled data for all years and all countries. This 
model gives a proxy of the covariates medium effects. The estimation results included 
in table 5A show that there was no significant change in the model structure during the 
period observed, as the dummy variables associated to time are not statistically 
significant. According to coefficients and marginal effects estimates, child poverty 
probability odds are most strongly influenced by variables such as: parent’s profession 
category and family composition. Globally speaking children with full time employee 
parents are the less vulnerable to poverty. In this context it should be noted that children 
with unemployed parents are the most exposed to poverty. Concerning family 
composition the results obtain, in line with the descriptive analysis, found children in 
single parents families and families with two adults and three or more children as the 
most probably poor. Finally, one important finding should be underline, regarding 
country covariates: Spanish, Italian and Poland children have a smaller probability of 
being poor than Portuguese children. This is particularly true for Spain and than for 
Italy, and less significant for Poland.  
How do the demographic and social attributes act in the probability of a child to be poor 
in each country? Does their influence differ? To answer these questions we estimate 
logit models for each country and test coefficients equality. From the results in table 6A 
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the strongest conclusion emerges that the impact of almost the covariates considered 
vary from country to country, which suggests an unequal profile of child poverty and, 
therefore, point out the need for different policies to tackle the problem.  
The similarities are found for gender and age. In fact the hypothesis testing supports the 
equality of the coefficients for these variables in the four models, which suggest the 
same effect of them in child poverty odds for the countries analyzed.  
The rule seems to be the differentiation of covariates impact. This is the case for the 
majority of variables included in the four models. We detail these differences for the 
following variables: (i) family dimension, (ii) family composition, (iii) parents 
profession’s category, (iv) parents working hours and (v) parents employment sector. 
(i) Family dimension: the positive signal of the estimated coefficient is in line 
with the common conclusion about the direct relation between family 
dimension and child poverty. The estimated coefficients suggest a higher 
impact of this variable in Portugal and in Spain. 
(ii) Family composition: in all the four countries single parent families and 
families with two adults and three or more children emerge as the most 
vulnerable to child poverty. However, according to the estimated models, in 
Italy and in Poland these two typologies seem not to be distinguished in terms 
of child poverty probabilities. Although this is not the case in Portugal and in 
Spain, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients also suggests a marginal 
differentiation for these typologies.  
(iii) Parent’s profession category: in this context and globally speaking, 
unemployment seems to have one of the strongest impact on child poverty 
probability, especially in Italy and Poland. Working in partial time also seems 
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to have different effects on child poverty – in Poland we found the highest 
impact of this variable. 
(iv) Number of working hours: despite the fact of non-statistical significance of 
this covariate in Portugal and in Italy, in the other two countries the magnitude 
of the corresponding coefficient suggests a marginal impact of this variable on 
the probability of a child to be poor. 
(v) Employment sector: having family working parents seems to be a condition 
of child poverty vulnerability in all countries except in Italy. For the other 
sectors the effect on child poverty odds is in general not so high. In Poland, 
sectors as self-employed without employees and employee have the highest 
distinction to self-employed with employees in terms of child poverty 
probabilities which suggest a strongest protection from poverty for Polish 
children with such parents.  
The coefficients differentiation might suggest a misleading picture of child poverty 
profile in the four countries. However it should be noted that the common model 
structure is in fact the most important result. The differences found in the impact of the 
covariates only derive from unequal policies compositions. 
 
3. Government intervention: policies to ensure sufficient resources for families 
 
The current analysis is only focused on cash benefits which directly support household 
income, such as by providing income for those temporarily out of the market for 
example, unemployment and sickness benefits) or supplementing the income of 
households with children (universal or targeted benefits)10. As the data base, we used 
the Mutual Information System on Social Protection in the Member States of the 
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European Union (MISSOC)11. The information that is reported annually by the 
European Commission makes it possible to identify the main changes that have 
occurred in each county12. 
 
Benefits target on family: maternity 
The maternity benefit is granted by all coutries13. Some differences exist across 
countries in the way the benefit is design. Table 1 presents a summary of the 
institutional features and changes regarding qualifying conditions and amount of 
benefit.  
[table 1, here] 
 
 
Regarding eligibility and rate of benefit, we may conclude that protection granted by 
Poland is more generous over the period. The Spanish and Portuguese systems had 
shown a move towards a more restrictive protection.  
Two means-tested benefits must be mentioned: a flat-rate benefit (maternity voucher) 
granted by the Italian system to non-working women and a prenatal allowance 
introduced in 2007, in Portugal, and open to pregnant women.  
 
Benefits target on family: unemployment 
Relating the institutional design of unemployment compensation, Portugal and Spain 
operated a dual system, i.e. a combination of an insurance scheme with an assistance 
scheme with means-tested while in Italy and Poland there is no special unemployment 
assistance scheme14.  
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In the insurance scheme, all coutries with the exception of Poland (means-tested and 
flat-rate benefit) use a replacement rate which is more generous in Spain15; in 2004, 
there was much diversity in the duration of payment, with Portugal having the most 
generous protection (from 12 to 30 months) and Italy and Poland the least (270 days and 
6-12 months, respectively).  
In the Portuguese and Spanish assistance schemes, the amount of benefits depends on 
the minimum wage. The rates of replacement (in 2004: 80 per cent and 75 per cent, 
respectively) were increased for the unemployed with dependants.  
Over the period, some important changes have been introduced in three countries: i) the 
qualifying period has been reduced in Portugal (less restrictive eligibility); ii) the rates 
of replacement have been increased in Spain, specially for unemployed with dependant 
children (more generous entitlement) while the amount of benefits in the two assistance 
schemes became dependent on an indexing reference of social support instead of 
minimum wage (less generous entitlement); iii) the duration of payment has been 
increased in Poland and Portugal (more generous entitlement)16.  
 
Benefits target on family: sickness 
The four countries offer a compulsory social insurance scheme for employees with 
earnings-related benefits17.  
With the exception of Poland (where the benefit corresponds to 80 per cent of the 
reference wage), the amount of the benefit is determined by applying variable 
percentages, depending on the length of incapacity, to the remuneration reference. In 
2004, the Polish system had the most generous rate of replacement and Italy the least 
(50 per cent or 67 per cent).  
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Over the period, a new rate has been introduced in Portugal: 65 per cent (instead of 55-
60 per cent) in case of incapacity period lower or equal to 90 days.  
 
Benefits target on family: minimum income schemes 
With the exception of Italy, all the countries have some form of minimum income 
schemes at a national level. The four countries can be divided into four groups (Frazier 
and Marlier, 2009): i) a relatively simple and comprehensive scheme open to all those 
with insufficient means to support themselves (Portugal); ii) a quite simple and 
categorical scheme with rather restricted eligibility and coverage of people in need of 
financial assistance (Poland); iii) a complex set of different, often categorical, schemes 
(Spain); iv) limited arrangements which is restricted to quite categories of people and 
not cover many of those in need (Italy)18.  
Substantial differences exist across countries in the way minimum income schemes are 
design, namely the eligibility conditions, the indicator for establishing the level of 
payment, the amount of benefits and duration of payment (European Parliament, 2007, 
2011; Frazier and Marlier, 2009)19. The large variation from country to country as well 
as the regional variations in Italy and Spain made quite impossible any cross-country 
comparison. 
However, some assessment of the MI schemes can be made. Regarding coverage, the 
situation can be characterized as follows: fairly comprehensive in Portugal and Spain, 
partial in Poland and very limited in Italy (Frazer and Marlier, 2009:56). Additionally, 
the effectiveness of the four schemes on poverty reduction was very low in the 
beginning of the period (European Parliament, 2007). In Poland, this situation could 
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have been improved as a result of the social assistance reform of 2004 aimed to improve 
the income support throughout the amount and take-up of benefits.  
In 2005, Portugal introduced two important changes in eligibility. First, the expansion 
of the right to benefits for individuals under 18 who are married or who have been 
living with a partner in situation comparable to marriage for at least one year. However, 
the availability for work become a more stringent requirement for all beneficiaries 
unemployed (before legislative change, the condition was only required for persons 
between 18 and 30).  
 
Benefits target on children  
During the period, new child allowances were implemented (Italy, Poland and 
Portugal). In the case of Poland, new regulations came into force in 2004 introducing 
means-tested benefits to replace universal child allowances. Table 2 identifies the 
benefits by country as well those that have been introduced over the period.  
 
[table 2, here] 
 
All the four countries provided a Child Benefit which is by far the most substantial 
cash benefit (EC, 2002). There some similar features, namely: i) with the exception of 
Portugal (16 years), the normal age limit is 18 years; ii) the existence of a ceiling 
income20. However, there are some differences related with the monthly amount and 
their variation with income (see table 3). 





In Spain, Poland and Portugal, the monthly amount of allowance supplements for 
handicapped children and young people depends on the age of the children. There is 
no specific amount in Italy: the ceiling of the household income is increased if one 
member is disabled.  
Another benefit is the birth grant, which is flat rate amount in Italy (for families with 3 
children), Spain and Poland (per child). In Portugal there is no specific benefit: the 
household is entitled to the Child Benefit21.  
With the exception of Spain, all the countries provide an allowance for single parents: 
in Poland, the amount per child varies according to the family’s income; in Italy and 
Portugal (granted since 2007), there is an increase in child benefits and related 
allowances.  
Some countries provide other special allowances. In 2005, Italy introduced a Social 
Card: a flat rate benefit aimed to increase the purchasing power of persons with a 
dependent child of less than 3 years old, and whose annual income not exceed the 
amount fixed by law.  
The Polish system provides also a child-raising benefit (flat rate amount paid during 
the parental leave, provided that monthly income per family member does not exceed 25 
per cent of the average wage for the previous year) and a child-minding allowance (is a 
universal benefit paid to workers who have to stop working in order to look after a 
child).  
Finally, Allowances for Studying are provided by Poland (universal benefits with fixed 
amount per child) and Portugal (ceiling income and fixed amount per child).  
According to European Commission, an overall improvement in family welfare had 
been notice between 2004 and 2008. However, “the multitude of approaches makes it 
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harder to identify clear trends (EC, 2008b). Indeed, some countries (like Poland) 
improved the most important family benefits, while others (like Spain) were 
fundamentally restructuring and systematizing this field of protection. During the 
period, new benefits – target on family or child allowances - were implemented (Poland 
and Portugal). In the case of Poland, there was a move from universal child benefits 
towards target-specific benefit allocation, or means-tested allowances. In Portugal, the 
policy goal has been focused on economic support for vulnerable families.  
 
4. Social transfers and poverty 
 
At this stage we have already seen that children seem to be particularly at risk of 
poverty, no matter the four countries analyzed. What has been the impact of public 
policies, in particularly social transfers, on poverty? We will first analyze the effect of 
these transfers on poverty by country and then we carry on a comparative discussion of 
their relative performance. 
 
Italy 
The first thing to be noticed is that social transfers have a smaller impact in 
reducing poverty within children than for all individuals, as figure 3 and table 7A 
show. Moreover, child-related transfers have a marginal effect in reducing child 
poverty incidence – around 15 per cent. This effect is quite the same during the 
period under study which may suggest a reduced effect of the policies undertaken 
to tackle child poverty. 
 





Despite the different nature of pensions and, therefore, their expected higher 
impact in reducing poverty, the results obtained show that poverty rates after 
pensions decrease for around a half, which triples the effect of child-related 
transfers.  
Taking into account that all transfers may impact on child poverty, the most 
outstanding result comes from the fact that, while poverty rates for all individuals 
fall around 60 per cent after social transfers, for children this decrease is only 
around 30 per cent. These results question the effectiveness of such transfers in 




The results obtained for Poland concerning the incidence of poverty after social 
transfers, show an important effect of such transfers in reducing poverty. This 
reduction is around 62 per cent. However, this effect is smaller within children - it 
is situated around 42 per cent. Figure 4 and table 7A show that the impact of 
social transfers is almost the same in the period under study, which may suggest 
unchanging policies.  
 
[figure 4, here] 
 
 
The central question of analysis is: what was the effect of child-related transfers 
on child poverty? Table 7A shows that this effect was situated around 17 per cent 
in the last two years and around 11 per cent in the first two years, which means an 
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increase in this effect. Is this increase due to new policies? We will detail this next 
section. 
Finally it is worth to note that pensions have an impact less than 50 per cent in 
decreasing poverty rates, which may be a consequence of their value. 
 
Portugal 
The first result to be mentioned concerns the fact that, despite the impact of social 
transfers in reducing poverty among all the age groups, it seems that this effect is 
relatively smaller for children (see figure 5 and table 7A). For them the reduction 
is around 30 per cent while for the whole population this proportion is situated 
around 50 per cent. This scenario applies to all years in the period under study 
which may suggest unchanged policies to tackle poverty.  
 
[figure 5, here] 
 
 
Child-related transfers allow a 10 per cent decrease in the risk of child poverty 
which is completely different from the effect of pensions, despite their different 
nature.  
The results obtained point out the importance of developing specific programs to 
reduce child poverty, as the level and type of social transfers that have been 








The most outstanding result from table 7A and figure 6 is the fact that child-
related transfers have nearly no effect in reducing child poverty rates, all over the 
period under study. This result suggests total ineffectiveness of policies 
specifically developed to tackle child poverty. With almost one child in every four 
poor in the last two years, what policies were carried on?  
Besides the previous result it should also be mentioned that in Spain as in the 
other three countries, social transfers have a bigger effect in reducing poverty 
rates for all the individuals than for children. In fact globally speaking social 
transfers promote a decrease of around 50 per cent on poverty incidence, value 
that is near 20 per cent in the case of children. 
 
[figure 6, here] 
 
 
Once again the results obtained question the policies undertaken to reduce child 
poverty rates and point out the need for a deep thinking about what has been done 
so far and what can be done to reduce child poverty. 
The comparative analysis of the impact of social transfers on child poverty has 
two important similarities and two marginal differences.  
The similarities: first, social transfers have a smaller effect on child poverty risk 
than on poverty risk for all individuals and secondly, the impact of child related 
transfers is less than one third of pension’s effect.  
The differences: the most outstanding difference regards the importance of child 
related transfers on child poverty. In Poland these transfers allow a 17 per cent 
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reduction on child poverty rates in the last two years which is the greatest impact.  
In the opposite side is Spain where these transfers have almost no effect. 





In this concluding section we seek to discuss the interaction between the profile of child 
poverty in the four countries and the social policies undertaken to ensure sufficient 
resources for families, during the period of analysis. Throughout we endeavour to 
underline the importance of investigate the impact of social policy on child poverty, in 
order to optimize policies designed to tackle the problem.  
The analysis of social transfers impact on child poverty carried on in the previous 
section showed that, globally speaking, the effect on poverty incidence for the whole 
population is higher than the corresponding for children. Moreover, child-related 
transfers seem to have a marginal effect in reducing child poverty rates.  
In Poland these effects are strong, in line with the 2004 social assistance reform that 
improved the most important family benefits. This country has a more generous 
protection of maternity, of sickness and specific benefits targeted on children, such as 
child-raising benefit, child-minding allowance and allowances for studying.  
Spain seems to appear on the opposite position: social transfers have the lowest effect in 
reducing poverty and, child-related transfers, have nearly no impact on child poverty. 
This situation is certainly a consequence of the reduced number / amount of family 
benefits referred in section 3.  
The situation of Portugal in terms social transfers effectiveness is dual: the reductions of 
child poverty rates is not significant, in spite of the increasing of support for families-at-
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risk. The analysis undertaken suggests the eligibility of target groups and the revision of 
the policies that have been used so far, despite the crisis that acts, by itself, as factor of 
poverty development. 
Finally in Italy, the results obtained are in line with the other countries, showing a 
relative impact of social transfers on poverty rates. Is this result a consequence of a 
restrictive minimum income scheme, a small number / amount of family benefits, 
referred in section 3?  
The estimated models point out the importance of labour market issues on child poverty 
odds. Italy and Poland showed the strongest impact of unemployment on these 
probabilities. The descriptive analysis showed that these countries have the highest 
incidence of child poverty within unemployment parents. These results are in line with 
the inexistence of specific unemployment assistance in these countries, as referred in 
section 3.  
A more generous protection of unemployment and the reforms introduced in Portugal 
and in Spain during the period over study, discussed in section 3, are certainly the 
reasons for the lower rates of child poverty in the context of unemployment.    
The results obtained point out the importance of designing measures to specific groups 
such as lone parent and large families and also to those with unemployment problems. 
For the later it should be noted that the existence of childcare infrastructures is also 
important. This was not tack into account in this paper because our analysis was strictly 
focused on social transfers. 
The analysis undertaken in this paper is based on cross-section data. The use of 
longitudinal data would certainly improve this investigation and reinforce the 




1. In the EU reducing child poverty has been a target for all member states.Whiteford and Adema 
(2007:6) spread out this goal to OECD countries: “(…) in recent decades public policies in many OECD 
countries have focused on the challenge of reducing child poverty.” 
2. Griggs and Walker (2008) discuss these costs and point out the wider social implications of child 
poverty. 
3.For a discussion on strategies to reduce child poverty see Whiteford and Adema (2007). 
4. Sen (1999) and Townsend (1979) are important references concerning the definition and measurement 
of poverty. 
5. For a discussion on this hypothesis, see Jenkins (2000). 
6. This is also the threshold adopted by EUROSTAT. 
7. The so-called three “i’s” of poverty. To a comprehensive discussion of this subject see, for example, 
Jenkins and Lambert (1998). 
8. Tables with an “A” are in the Annex. 
9. Bastos et al. (2009) investigate these differences for Portugal.  
10. The universal benefits are granted to all families with children and often depend on the size of the 
family. The targeted benefits aimed to support the most vulnerable families (low income, lone parents, 
large families or families with disable children (EC, 2008a). 
11. http://www.missoc.org. 
12. This database was complemented by other sources (Eurostat, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008; Baptista, 2007; 
Strati, 2007; Villagomez, 2007; Wóycicka, 2007) 
13. A paternity benefit granted by all countries. The Portuguese system also provides employees and self-
employed people with other four contributory benefits.  
14. The accumulation with earnings from work is only possible in Spain: receiving total unemployment 
benefit is compatible with carrying out a part-time gainful activity as employee (assistance scheme: the 
earnings can not exceed 75 per cent of the minimum wage). 
15. In Spain and Portugal, a maximum and a minimum amount are set; the Spanish system has a special 
feature, i.e. the minimum amount varies according to the number of dependent children.  
16. In Portugal, the duration of payment has been only extended for older unemployed with longer 
contributory career.  
24 
 
17. In all countries, with the exception of Portugal, there is a statutory continuation of payment of wage 
by employers: i) Spain: 60 per cent of the wage from the 4th up to the 15th day of illness; ii) Italy: payment 
of wage for a maximum of 180 days per year; and iii) Poland:  for the first 33 calendar days of illness in 
any calendar year the employer continues to pay 80 per cent of the reference wage per month.  
18. Italy and Spain do not have a national minimum income scheme, but rather different regional 
arrangements. 
19. The amount of benefit is usually analyzed throughout some specific issues, namely: the value of the 
minimum income for a single person, variations according to family composition. 
20. The Italian system includes another condition: at least 70 per cent of the earnings must have its source 
in dependent 
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Figure 1. Incidence of child poverty by age  
 
Source: EU_SILC (2004-2008) 
 
Figure 2. Incidence of child poverty within unemployed parents 
 




Figure 3. Incidence of poverty and social transfers - Italy 
 
Source: EU_SILC (2004-2008). 
 
Figure 4. Incidence of poverty and social transfers - Poland 
  










Figure 5. Incidence of poverty and social transfers - Portugal 
 
Source: EU_SILC (2004-2008). 
 
Figure 6. Incidence of poverty and social transfers - Spain 
 




Table 1. Maternity benefit: institutional changes over 2004-2008 
 Spain Italy Poland Portugal 
Qualifying 
conditions 
For  workers over 26 
years of age, the 
qualifying conditions 
(contributions paid 
for at least 6 months) 
have been restricted  
No applicable  No applicable Contributions paid 
for at least 6 months 
Amount 
of benefit  
No change (100% of 
reference wage) 
No change (80% of 
reference wage) 
No change (100% 
of reference wage) 
The amount (100% 
of reference wage) 
has been reduced 
(80%) when women 
opt for an extended 
leave. 
Minimum amount: 




Table 2. Family Benefits 2004-2008 
 Spain Italy Poland Portugal 
Child benefit     
Allowances for children with disabilities       
Birth  allowances      
Allowance for single parents   Since 2004 Since 2007 
Child-raising and child-minding allowances      
Allowances  for studying    Since 2004  
Social Card   Since 2005   
Source: MISSOC. 
 
Table 3: Child Benefit 2004 - 2008 
 Spain Italy Poland Portugal 
Monthly 
amount 
The amount depends 
on the age of child 
The amount is in 
inverse function to the 
household income and 
in direct function to the 
family dimension  
The amount become 
dependent on the age of 
child (in 2004, the 
amount was dependent 
on the number of 
children) 
The amount depends on 
the reference income 
(based on income and 
family dimension) and 




The ceiling is 
increased from the 
fourth child (in 
2004: from the 2nd 
child) 
Yes No There are six earning 
levels dependent on 





Table 1A - Incidence of poverty by demographic attributes – all  (percentage) 
Indicators 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
IT PL PT SP IT PL PT SP IT PL PT SP IT PL PT SP IT PL PT SP 
Sex                     
Male 17.7 na 19.2 19.0 17.0 21.3 18.7 18.5 18.0 19.7 17.7 18.5 18.4 17.6 17.2 18.6 17.1 17.0 17.9 18.3 
Female 20.5 na 21.6 20.8 20.5 19.9 20.1 20.9 21.1 18.5 19.1 21.2 21.2 17.1 19.0 20.9 20.1 16.7 19.0 21.0 
Age group                     
0-17 (children) 24.7 na 24.6 24.4 23.6 29.3 23.7 24.2 24.5 26.3 20.8 24.3 25.4 24.2 20.9 24.2 24.7 22.4 22.8 24.4 
18-64 (Adults) 17.0 na 17.0 16.1 16.4 20.4 15.9 16.1 17.6 19.1 15.7 16.0 17.6 17.2 15.3 16.4 16.3 16.3 16.2 16.4 
+65 (Elderly) 21.1 na 29.0 29.6 22.6 7.3 27.7 29.4 21.7 7.8 26.2 30.7 21.9 7.8 25.6 28.5 20.9 11.7 22.2 27.6 
Family dimension                     
1 individual 28.1 na 35.0 38.7 27.9 16.5 37.1 30.4 27.5 16.1 34.9 34.9 27.3 15.6 33.2 34.6 26.3 20.3 30.8 31.7 
2 individuals 15.8 na 23.9 21.7 15.6 11.8 22.5 20.2 15.5 11.2 23.0 20.5 16.1 10.7 22.6 19.1 15.0 10.4 20.3 20.4 
3 individuals 13.7 na 14.0 14.8 14.1 16.1 13.7 15.8 14.6 13.5 13.3 14.9 13.5 14.0 12.5 15.6 13.7 12.6 14.5 14.7 
4 individuals 19.5 na 19.2 18.5 18.4 20.5 17.8 18.7 19.9 19.4 16.0 18.9 20.3 16.5 14.5 19.1 18.7 15.3 16.2 17.9 
5 individuals 24.6 na 22.1 19.4 26.0 27.9 19.7 18.6 28.5 26.2 17.2 20.9 31.0 22.4 20.2 17.7 28.8 20.6 17.8 24.8 
6 individuals 32.3 na 24.9 23.4 28.6 28.3 20.8 19.6 31.8 26.6 24.5 24.2 34.6 22.6 26.5 25.7 27.6 25.1 35.2 39.2 
+ 6 individuals 35.7 na 35.7 37.2 28.1 36.8 37.0 46.0 39.1 35.1 29.3 56.0 43.1 32.8 36.3 67.5 29.4 30.3 25.6 48.7 
Family composition                     
Single adult 28.1 na 35.0 38.7 27.9 16.4 37.1 34.0 27.5 16.0 34.9 34.9 27.3 15.6 33.2 34.6 26.3 20.3 30.8 31.7 
Two adults without children, both < 65 11.8 na 16.2 12.4 9.7 13.5 15.2 10.6 11.3 13.7 18.3 10.3 11.0 12.0 17.6 11.3 10.6 11.2 16.5 12.1 
Two adults without children (at least one adult > 65) 17.6 na 30.2 29.8 19.5 6.3 28.3 29.2 18.3 6.2 25.9 30.2 18.9 6.2 24.6 27.2 17.0 7.6 21.8 29.6 
Other households without children 9.4 na 11.5 11.2 9.2 13.8 8.8 13.2 8.9 11.7 9.5 12.1 10.6 9.8 9.4 12.2 8.9 9.1 7.4 10.8 
Single adult with 1+ children 35.8 na 34.8 40.3 35.4 40.1 31.5 37.3 31.9 31.6 41.2 37.6 31.2 31.0 33.6 34.1 35.6 30.2 38.9 38.2 
Two adults with one single child 14.0 na 12.8 14.3 15.1 16.6 14.7 14.4 17.7 14.2 12.1 14.9 14.8 15.3 12.2 16.4 15.2 13.9 16.5 15.5 
Two adults with 2 children  23.1 na 24.0 24.3 21.4 22.9 23.7 22.8 22.1 21.4 18.6 22.1 23.0 19.7 17.0 22.3 21.6 17.9 20.6 21.8 
Two adults with 3+ children 35.7 na 41.0 38.2 34.5 44.8 42.0 35.9 40.8 37.7 37.8 41.8 41.2 36.2 43.3 36.8 37.7 34.4 31.9 44.4 
Other households with 1+ children  20.5 na 17.5 21.0 21.1 22.5 14.9 18.4 23.0 23.6 15.8 20.4 23.1 19.5 16.5 20.0 20.2 19.8 17.8 21.6 






Table 2A - Incidence of poverty by demographic attributes – Children  (percentage) 
Indicators 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
IT PL PT SP IT PL PT SP IT PL PT SP IT PL PT SP IT PL PT SP 
Sex                     
Male 24.3 na 22.9 25.8 22.8 28.6 22.7 24.7 24.2 25.3 20.7 23.9 25.7 22.3 21.6 23.8 24.9 21.8 25.6 23.5 
Female 24.6 na 26.2 23.1 24.4 29.9 23.9 23.8 24.8 27.3 20.2 24.4 25.0 25.8 20.2 23.7 25.0 22.9 19.7 24.8 
Family dimension                     
2 individuals 28.1 na 25.3 33.8 21.7 32.9 24.9 38.9 20.3 25.5 33.3 35.7 27.3 31.4 22.8 25.7 28.3 22.8 36.6 35.3 
3 individuals 18.0 na 15.0 16.1 18.6 20.4 16.6 15.5 18.9 17.8 15.9 17.0 16.2 17.8 13.8 16.7 27.0 15.0 17.0 16.6 
4 individuals 23.0 na 24.2 24.0 22.0 23.6 21.5 23.1 22.7 22.1 18.4 21.9 24.1 20.2 17.8 22.7 22.8 18.0 21.0 21.8 
5 individuals 30.3 na 28.6 29.7 30.5 33.6 28.8 27.2 34.4 29.7 24.5 32.2 37.3 25.6 27.6 27.4 34.1 23.6 22.7 36.4 
6 individuals 39.5 na 38.2 38.0 36.0 35.3 30.0 29.0 39.1 30.8 36.5 34.2 34.7 27.5 38.1 32.1 33.2 32.6 55.3 50.9 
+ 6 individuals 33.8 na 48.2 46.9 34.9 43.0 52.0 56.2 39.6 40.5 36.2 67.6 46.8 36.8 53.5 77.3 32.9 34.0 37.5 61.5 
Family composition                     
Single adult with 1+ children 37.6 na 43.8 43.1 36.3 47.7 35.2 44.1 34.5 37.4 48.2 39.7 34.0 39.0 40.7 40.7 39.6 35.2 42.5 46.9 
Two adults with one single child 14.4 na 11.8 13.3 14.7 17.2 14.0 12.9 16.9 15.6 11.8 14.5 13.9 15.2 11.4 14.8 16.3 12.9 14.3 14.6 
Two adults with 2 children  23.0 na 24.9 24.2 21.5 23.1 22.6 22.9 21.8 21.7 17.9 21.7 23.5 19.8 17.3 22.2 22.0 17.9 20.2 21.6 
Two adults with 3+ children 35.9 na 43.6 39.9 35.4 47.3 43.2 38.9 38.9 38.9 37.6 44.6 41.6 36.6 47.7 40.2 38.4 33.8 34.1 46.4 
Other households with 1+ children  22.8 na 21.2 25.0 24.0 25.1 20.4 23.1 26.7 26.0 18.9 26.4 27.1 22.2 20.5 26.2 24.6 22.4 24.3 30.1 













Table 3A - Incidence of poverty by social attributes – all   (percentage) 
Indicators 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
IT PL PT SP IT PL PT SP IT PL PT SP IT PL PT SP IT PL PT SP 
Profession category                     
Employee (full time) 9.8 na 20.2 9.5 10.3 11.0 11.2 8.6 11.7 9.9 8.2 8.9 12.3 10.3 9.2 9.1 11.1 9.8 10.0 8.8 
Employee (part time) 29.4 na 24.1 19.2 27.9 24.9 28.6 17.4 31.6 19.0 35.1 17.6 32.6 11.9 33.7 14.2 33.8 11.6 38.9 15.5 
Self-employed (full-time) 21.8 na 21.3 36.4 19.9 34.0 27.3 35.1 21.4 32.8 25.7 31.1 20.3 28.9 18.6 34.8 18.7 29.4 28.2 35.5 
Self-employed (part-time) 23.5 na 13.9 25.3 26.0 35.3 26.8 31.0 32.3 35.7 32.4 34.3 28.5 37.0 35.2 41.8 30.7 39.7 30.0 20.4 
Unemployed 63.9 na 35.4 42.5 64.5 57.3 29.9 38.9 59.0 63.2 22.8 44.3 60.3 56.4 40.9 39.7 60.7 50.6 36.5 36.7 
Retired 14.9 na 20.0 23.8 15.6 15.7 23.7 25.1 15.8 9.9. 46.1 24.6 15.4 8.0 33.4 31.9 14.6 10.8 20.5 20.9 
Other inactive 34.4 na 19.5 29.8 35.8 39.7 42.5 29.3 34.9 28.8 43.4 32.7 38.7 28.5 43.0 33.4 36.5 30.3 41.1 34.5 
Number of worked  hours                     
until 10 hours 13.4 na 19.9 29.9 12.6 25.8 12.8 34.0 15.1 20.1 12.7 43.1 14.6 22.5 11.6 20.9 13.5 39.4 13.2 21.1 
35 – 40 hours 12.8 na 17.4 11.6 13.3 14.5 15.8 11.3 12.3 12.6 10.9 10.2 14.0 13.2 11.1 10.9 13.1 13.2 12.1 10.6 
40 – 45 hours 18.6 na 24.4 15.4 18.7 16.5 18.0 16.0 18.8 19.1 13.2 16.5 21.0 15.5 10.8 15. 18.8 13.8 14.4 13.9 
Employment sector                     
self-employed with employees 19.4 na 18.6 32.8 15.4 19.4 23.6 31.2 18.7 17.0 20.0 31.1 16.2 18.4 14.7 30.8 16.8 16.5 18.6 37.0 
self-employed without employees 27.5 na 20.2 35.1 29.5 35.5 32.6 35.1 28.9 35.1 35.0 30.5 29.0 30.0 32.3 32.9 27.0 31.0 34.8 31.3 
employee 15.1 na 20.6 16.0 15.3 17.1 15.3 14.8 15.7 15.4 14.0 15.3 16.1 14.3 14.9 15.1 14.9 13.7 14.7 15.2 
family worker 26.9 na 15.9 31.7 19.6 26.9 75.9 39.3 27.0 36.5 59.1 38.3 23.0 30.4 48.1 37.4 23.6 32.1 59.4 44.6 
Type of contract                     
permanent job/work contract of unlimited duration 11.9 na 20.4 10.9 12.4 14.3 13.3 10.3 12.0 12.1 12.0 10.4 13.0 11.4 12.6 10.5 11.9 11.3 12.6 9.7 
temporary job/work contract of limited duration 39.5 na 23.1 31.6 38.7 33.0 29.1 28.0 42.6 32.9 26.9 30.4 40.2 29.0 29.0 29.6 37.8 25.7 27.4 30.8 











Table 4A - Incidence of poverty by social attributes – Children  (percentage) 
Indicators 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
IT PL PT SP IT PL PT SP IT PL PT SP IT PL PT SP IT PL PT SP 
Profession category                     
Employee (full time) 12.6 na 22.4 15.1 13.8 15.7 16.3 14.7 15.8 13.2 12.3 15.3 16.9 14.2 14.3 14.7 16.5 13.4 13.0 14.2 
Employee (part time) 35.8 na 27.6 27.0 32.8 37.8 49.2 23.0 36.9 34.0 41.9 22.9 36.5 15.8 52.5 18.9 40.2 18.3 61.3 19.1 
Self-employed (full-time) 30.4 na 24.2 45.1 25.0 40.9 35.6 44.1 27.6 40.5 30.9 40.0 27.3 33.6 17.2 40.6 25.6 35.2 36.3 46.3 
Self-employed (part-time) 33.3 na 25.8 35.7 45.2 53.1 36.2 40.4 48.5 57.9 20.8 40.5 40.0 56.3 46.4 44.6 46.7 59.7 43.4 22.7 
Unemployed 72.9 na 48.9 48.9 74.8 65.7 38.2 48.0 65.5 67.9 48.5 51.5 69.4 64.5 52.2 48.8 68.6 50.3 43.0 42.2 
Retired 17.7 na 27.2 32.0 20.4 31.9 27.1 32.9 2.1 22.8 25.3 35.2 23.3 14.3 37.2 30.8 22.3 17.0 36.9 26.0 
Other inactive 48.5 na 20.8 37.8 52.5 54.7 58.4 36.7 46.7 44.9 55.0 41.0 54.6 46.3 56.2 42.3 57.0 45.8 58.6 45.3 
Number of worked  hours                     
until 10 hours 17.9 na 22.8 39.8 17.1 39.6 18.5 40.3 19.3 53.7 17.4 49.4 20.3 41.6 15.6 28.1 19.4 77.2 18.2 32.6 
35 – 40 hours 15.1 na 20.4 17.3 14.8 19.6 22.2 17.4 14.4 16.6 15.5 15.3 17.6 17.6 11.9 15.1 16.4 17.6 14.6 15.2 
40 – 45 hours 24.4 na 28.4 23.9 23.8 21.0 21.2 24.9 22.3 22.5 14.9 31.3 25.4 20.2 10.5 24.4 25.2 16.0 15.0 17.3 
Employment sector                     
self-employed with employees 24.9 na 23.6 38.9 20.6 26.3 27.2 42.1 24.6 23.2 18.8 34.6 20.3 24.5 14.7 35.5 21.1 20.3 20.5 49.6 
self-employed without employees 36.8 na 23.0 46.4 35.5 45.6 39.1 41.3 34.2 46.8 38.9 39.9 36.2 37.7 29.7 38.9 35.1 39.9 45.4 40.4 
employee 19.7 na 25.1 20.4 20.3 25.6 20.0 19.8 21.0 21.2 17.8 20.5 22.1 20.5 19.5 19.6 21.4 18.2 19.3 19.4 
family worker 33.3 na 19.6 36.8 18.1 38.2 79.1 59.3 23.9 63.1 82.9 49.7 19.4 45.3 79.9 51.8 22.1 38.6 78.8 73.5 
Type of contract                     
permanent job/work contract of unlimited duration 15.4 na 24.8 13.2 15.9 21.1 17.1 13.2 14.7 15.6 15.4 13.1 16.8 15.9 16.3 13.1 17.2 15.2 15.9 11.1 
temporary job/work contract of limited duration 49.1 na 27.8 39.0 49.5 42.1 36.9 35.4 56.9 41.6 31.8 39.9 53.1 37.2 33.9 37.3 47.2 29.7 34.8 38.1 





Table  5A – Estimation results and marginal effects (I) 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =      98660 
                                                  Wald chi2(27)   =    9894.22 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -44728.515                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1114 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
        poor |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        male |  -.0311839   .0168131    -1.85   0.064    -.0641371    .0017692 
         age |   .0185588   .0017706    10.48   0.000     .0150885     .022029 
      famdim |   .2491685   .0104236    23.90   0.000     .2287386    .2695984 
  _Ihx060_10 |   -1.07891    .039799   -27.11   0.000    -1.156914   -1.000905 
  _Ihx060_11 |  -.7682355   .0357484   -21.49   0.000     -.838301   -.6981699 
  _Ihx060_12 |  -.2593207   .0442129    -5.87   0.000    -.3459764    -.172665 
  _Ihx060_13 |  -1.173652    .048958   -23.97   0.000    -1.269608   -1.077696 
  _Ihx060_16 |  -.8722801   .1168368    -7.47   0.000    -1.101276   -.6432841 
  _Ipl210a_2 |   1.032018   .0419935    24.58   0.000     .9497123    1.114324 
  _Ipl210a_3 |   .9707316   .0509258    19.06   0.000     .8709189    1.070544 
  _Ipl210a_4 |     1.5729   .0741296    21.22   0.000     1.427609    1.718192 
  _Ipl210a_5 |   2.010571    .040268    49.93   0.000     1.931647    2.089495 
  _Ipl210a_6 |   .5990043   .1620523     3.70   0.000     .2813877    .9166208 
  _Ipl210a_7 |   1.397756    .324691     4.30   0.000     .7613729    2.034138 
  _Ipl210a_8 |    1.74526     .06028    28.95   0.000     1.627114    1.863407 
  _Ipl210a_9 |   1.806513   1.227883     1.47   0.141    -.6000929     4.21312 
       hwork |   .0070141   .0008868     7.91   0.000      .005276    .0087522 
   _Ipl040_2 |   .6388605    .033198    19.24   0.000     .5737936    .7039274 
   _Ipl040_3 |   .3715601   .0564555     6.58   0.000     .2609094    .4822108 
   _Ipl040_4 |   .5292176   .0863181     6.13   0.000     .3600371    .6983981 
_Irb010_2005 |   .0197185   .0287503     0.69   0.493    -.0366311    .0760681 
_Irb010_2006 |    .006806   .0292388     0.23   0.816     -.050501     .064113 
_Irb010_2007 |  -.0325119   .0296936    -1.09   0.274    -.0907104    .0256866 
_Irb010_2008 |   .0171938   .0296102     0.58   0.561    -.0408412    .0752288 
   _Irb020_2 |  -.3328023   .0219556   -15.16   0.000    -.3758345   -.2897701 
   _Irb020_3 |  -.1519088   .0240372    -6.32   0.000    -.1990208   -.1047967 
   _Irb020_4 |  -.0364047   .0362916    -1.00   0.316     -.107535    .0347255 







Marginal effects after logit 
 
      y  = Pr(poor) (predict) 
         =  .17945293 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    male*|  -.0045927      .00248   -1.85   0.064  -.009447  .000261   .509639 
     age |   .0027328      .00026   10.50   0.000   .002223  .003243   8.28971 
  famdim |     .03669      .00154   23.79   0.000   .033667  .039713   4.26589 
_Ihx0~10*|   -.127091      .00363  -35.01   0.000  -.134206 -.119976    .18057 
_Ihx0~11*|   -.109358      .00492  -22.21   0.000  -.119008 -.099708   .425147 
_Ihx0~12*|  -.0361675      .00583   -6.20   0.000  -.047594 -.024741    .17688 
_Ihx0~13*|  -.1328717      .00414  -32.09   0.000  -.140986 -.124757   .155818 
_Ihx0~16*|  -.0959974      .00905  -10.61   0.000  -.113728 -.078266   .004926 
_Ipl21~2*|   .1976035      .00963   20.52   0.000   .178732  .216475   .035871 
_Ipl21~3*|   .1678937      .01001   16.78   0.000   .148281  .187507   .220008 
_Ipl21~4*|   .3316271      .01838   18.04   0.000   .295595  .367659   .013055 
_Ipl21~5*|   .4349157      .00943   46.12   0.000   .416432    .4534    .03134 
_Ipl21~6*|   .1052132      .03296    3.19   0.001   .040621  .169805   .002281 
_Ipl21~7*|   .2899358      .08084    3.59   0.000   .131486  .448386   .000517 
_Ipl21~8*|   .3741523      .01478   25.31   0.000   .345178  .403126   .013937 
_Ipl21~9*|   .3916698      .30075    1.30   0.193  -.197795  .981135    .00003 
   hwork |   .0010328      .00013    7.90   0.000   .000777  .001289   42.9509 
_Ipl04~2*|   .1073576      .00625   17.17   0.000   .095103  .119613   .159112 
_Ipl04~3*|    .051505      .00735    7.01   0.000   .037096  .065914   .752311 
_Ipl04~4*|   .0910742      .01697    5.37   0.000   .057813  .124336    .00824 
_Ir~2005*|   .0029135      .00426    0.68   0.494  -.005441  .011268   .229759 
_Ir~2006*|   .0010034      .00432    0.23   0.816  -.007456  .009463   .213268 
_Ir~2007*|  -.0047579      .00432   -1.10   0.271  -.013221  .003706   .203923 
_Ir~2008*|   .0025402      .00439    0.58   0.563  -.006062  .011143   .198378 
_Irb02~2*|  -.0479749      .00309  -15.55   0.000  -.054022 -.041928   .398307 
_Irb02~3*|  -.0218917      .00339   -6.46   0.000  -.028529 -.015254     .2791 








Table 6A – Estimation results (II) 
Simultaneous results for PT, ES, IT, PL 
 
                                                  Number of obs   =      98660 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
PT_poor      | 
        male |  -.0370857   .0641315    -0.58   0.563    -.1627811    .0886097 
         age |   .0292023    .006834     4.27   0.000      .015808    .0425967 
      famdim |   .4113703   .0401071    10.26   0.000      .332762    .4899787 
  _Ihx060_10 |   -1.65633    .134458   -12.32   0.000    -1.919862   -1.392797 
  _Ihx060_11 |  -1.440168   .1231491   -11.69   0.000    -1.681536     -1.1988 
  _Ihx060_12 |   -1.03667   .1591658    -6.51   0.000     -1.34863    -.724711 
  _Ihx060_13 |  -2.008599   .1709101   -11.75   0.000    -2.343576   -1.673621 
  _Ihx060_16 |  -1.689992   .8701708    -1.94   0.052    -3.395495    .0155115 
  _Ipl210a_2 |   1.175002   .1808325     6.50   0.000     .8205768    1.529427 
  _Ipl210a_3 |   .7715824   .2180945     3.54   0.000     .3441251     1.19904 
  _Ipl210a_4 |   1.072934   .3236318     3.32   0.001     .4386275    1.707241 
  _Ipl210a_5 |   1.452749    .170277     8.53   0.000     1.119012    1.786485 
  _Ipl210a_6 |   1.835978    .927148     1.98   0.048     .0188014    3.653155 
  _Ipl210a_7 |   2.634786   .8992646     2.93   0.003     .8722602    4.397313 
  _Ipl210a_8 |   .6495447   .3551852     1.83   0.067    -.0466054    1.345695 
  _Ipl210a_9 |  (omitted) 
       hwork |  -.0003162   .0034348    -0.09   0.927    -.0070482    .0064158 
   _Ipl040_2 |   .3602101   .1357813     2.65   0.008     .0940836    .6263365 
   _Ipl040_3 |   .2996456   .2392049     1.25   0.210    -.1691874    .7684786 
   _Ipl040_4 |     1.2856   .5818856     2.21   0.027     .1451255    2.426075 
_Irb010_2005 |  -.1730579   .1033866    -1.67   0.094     -.375692    .0295762 
_Irb010_2006 |  -.3173717   .1068395    -2.97   0.003    -.5267733   -.1079702 
_Irb010_2007 |  -.3897106   .1104988    -3.53   0.000    -.6062842    -.173137 
_Irb010_2008 |  -.2263091   .1115446    -2.03   0.042    -.4449326   -.0076857 











             |               Robust 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ES_poor      | 
        male |   .0114381   .0335132     0.34   0.733    -.0542465    .0771227 
         age |   .0241305    .003572     6.76   0.000     .0171296    .0311315 
      famdim |   .4807674   .0314972    15.26   0.000     .4190339    .5425008 
  _Ihx060_10 |  -1.355222   .0817737   -16.57   0.000    -1.515495   -1.194948 
  _Ihx060_11 |  -1.265784   .0773494   -16.36   0.000    -1.417386   -1.114181 
  _Ihx060_12 |  -1.011248   .1068659    -9.46   0.000    -1.220702    -.801795 
  _Ihx060_13 |  -1.809844   .1131304   -16.00   0.000    -2.031576   -1.588113 
  _Ihx060_16 |  -2.550681   .3416688    -7.47   0.000     -3.22034   -1.881023 
  _Ipl210a_2 |   .7924324   .0785528    10.09   0.000     .6384717     .946393 
  _Ipl210a_3 |   1.417274   .1209424    11.72   0.000     1.180231    1.654317 
  _Ipl210a_4 |    1.44932   .1840295     7.88   0.000     1.088629    1.810011 
  _Ipl210a_5 |   1.553527   .0751464    20.67   0.000     1.406243    1.700812 
  _Ipl210a_6 |   .9403643   .8006741     1.17   0.240    -.6289281    2.509657 
  _Ipl210a_7 |  -.1969672   .8783334    -0.22   0.823    -1.918469    1.524535 
  _Ipl210a_8 |   1.182713   .1400723     8.44   0.000     .9081763     1.45725 
  _Ipl210a_9 |  (omitted) 
       hwork |   .0130123   .0017889     7.27   0.000     .0095062    .0165185 
   _Ipl040_2 |   .3562414    .067935     5.24   0.000     .2230912    .4893916 
   _Ipl040_3 |   .1087047   .1287083     0.84   0.398    -.1435589    .3609682 
   _Ipl040_4 |   1.266005   .2984647     4.24   0.000     .6810248    1.850985 
_Irb010_2005 |  -.0996429   .0511009    -1.95   0.051    -.1997989    .0005131 
_Irb010_2006 |   .0453313   .0518131     0.87   0.382    -.0562205    .1468831 
_Irb010_2007 |  -.0745382   .0533313    -1.40   0.162    -.1790656    .0299891 
_Irb010_2008 |  -.0259296   .0529518    -0.49   0.624    -.1297133    .0778541 

















             |               Robust 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
IT_poor      | 
        male |  -.0132918   .0279562    -0.48   0.634    -.0680849    .0415013 
         age |   .0152988   .0029592     5.17   0.000     .0094988    .0210988 
      famdim |   .1588771   .0247545     6.42   0.000     .1103593     .207395 
  _Ihx060_10 |  -.9876554   .0621254   -15.90   0.000    -1.109419   -.8658919 
  _Ihx060_11 |  -.5334186   .0610542    -8.74   0.000    -.6530827   -.4137545 
  _Ihx060_12 |   .0769224   .0833927     0.92   0.356    -.0865243    .2403692 
  _Ihx060_13 |   -.634718   .0922376    -6.88   0.000    -.8155005   -.4539356 
  _Ihx060_16 |  (omitted) 
  _Ipl210a_2 |    1.24015   .0636508    19.48   0.000     1.115397    1.364903 
  _Ipl210a_3 |   .7719956   .0808785     9.55   0.000     .6134768    .9305145 
  _Ipl210a_4 |   1.247505    .130215     9.58   0.000     .9922879    1.502721 
  _Ipl210a_5 |   2.498159   .0795373    31.41   0.000     2.342269    2.654049 
  _Ipl210a_6 |   .8972793   .3262742     2.75   0.006     .2577937    1.536765 
  _Ipl210a_7 |   3.276674   .6411001     5.11   0.000      2.02014    4.533207 
  _Ipl210a_8 |   2.001163   .0872802    22.93   0.000     1.830097    2.172229 
  _Ipl210a_9 |  (omitted) 
       hwork |   .0018664   .0016042     1.16   0.245    -.0012778    .0050105 
   _Ipl040_2 |   .6931329   .0512182    13.53   0.000      .592747    .7935188 
   _Ipl040_3 |     .43658     .08887     4.91   0.000      .262398     .610762 
   _Ipl040_4 |   .3142345   .1392243     2.26   0.024     .0413598    .5871092 
_Irb010_2005 |   .0512585     .04372     1.17   0.241    -.0344311    .1369481 
_Irb010_2006 |   .0539124   .0438544     1.23   0.219    -.0320405    .1398654 
_Irb010_2007 |   .0861212   .0437904     1.97   0.049     .0002935    .1719488 
_Irb010_2008 |   .1059197   .0436718     2.43   0.015     .0203245    .1915149 

















             |               Robust 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
PL_poor      | 
        male |  -.0910232   .0306427    -2.97   0.003    -.1510818   -.0309645 
         age |   .0112903   .0032142     3.51   0.000     .0049906    .0175899 
      famdim |   .2115151    .013848    15.27   0.000     .1843736    .2386567 
  _Ihx060_10 |  -.6920433   .0821145    -8.43   0.000    -.8529848   -.5311019 
  _Ihx060_11 |  -.4789113   .0719322    -6.66   0.000    -.6198959   -.3379268 
  _Ihx060_12 |   .0112507   .0799559     0.14   0.888    -.1454599    .1679613 
  _Ihx060_13 |  -1.088214   .0855824   -12.72   0.000    -1.255952   -.9204751 
  _Ihx060_16 |  -.3027823   .1475032    -2.05   0.040    -.5918832   -.0136814 
  _Ipl210a_2 |   1.039004   .0962157    10.80   0.000     .8504248    1.227584 
  _Ipl210a_3 |   1.232145   .0878029    14.03   0.000     1.060055    1.404236 
  _Ipl210a_4 |   2.056136    .119096    17.26   0.000     1.822713     2.28956 
  _Ipl210a_5 |    2.14853   .0642126    33.46   0.000     2.022675    2.274384 
  _Ipl210a_6 |   .6382943   .1927514     3.31   0.001     .2605084     1.01608 
  _Ipl210a_7 |   1.047532   .4936751     2.12   0.034      .079947    2.015118 
  _Ipl210a_8 |   1.850331   .1124009    16.46   0.000     1.630029    2.070633 
  _Ipl210a_9 |   1.670456   1.173542     1.42   0.155     -.629644    3.970555 
       hwork |   .0073172   .0015351     4.77   0.000     .0043084    .0103259 
   _Ipl040_2 |   .9823698   .0736193    13.34   0.000     .8380786    1.126661 
   _Ipl040_3 |   .8403594   .1062301     7.91   0.000     .6321523    1.048567 
   _Ipl040_4 |   1.040615   .1456888     7.14   0.000     .7550702     1.32616 
_Irb010_2005 |   .0483745   .0430901     1.12   0.262    -.0360805    .1328295 
_Irb010_2006 |  -.0359051   .0443476    -0.81   0.418    -.1228249    .0510147 
_Irb010_2007 |  -.0823181   .0460329    -1.79   0.074     -.172541    .0079048 
_Irb010_2008 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |  -3.443455   .1525781   -22.57   0.000    -3.742502   -3.144407 
 
Variables description: 
. sex – Male=1  . age    . famdim – family dimension  . Ihx060- family composition 
. Ipl210a – parent’s profession category . hwork- number of worked hours in the main activity 





Table 7A - At-Risk-of-Poverty Rates after and before social transfers: Whole population and Children     (percentage) 
Indicators 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
IT PL PT SP IT PL PT SP IT PL PT SP IT PL PT SP IT PL PT SP 
Average Equivalized Disposable Income 
(modified OECD scale) 15810 na 8853 10292 16664 3039 9377 11881 16638 3704 9522 12609 17213 4149 9886 12966 18088 4938 10173 14535 
Poverty line (as 60%of the EDI national 
median) 8119 na 4147 5169 8607 1520 4312 6143 8712 1867 4378 6652 9003 2101 4519 6800 9583 2942 4827 7753 
ALL (percentage)                     
At-risk-of-poverty-rate (total 
income) 19.1 na 20.5 20.4 18.8 20.6 19.4 20.5 19.6 19.1 18.6 20.4 19.8 17.3 18.1 19.9 18.2 16.9 19.1 19.6 
At-risk-of-poverty-rate (before 
transfers, include pensions) 42.7 na 41.4 38.8 42.8 50.8 40.7 38.7 42.2 49.1 40.3 38.4 43.4 47.1 40.1 40.4 43.3 44.1 41.3 38.3 
At-risk-of-poverty-rate (before 
transfers, except pensions) 23.6 na 26.5 24.5 23.4 29.8 25.7 24.7 24.0 28.6 25.4 24.3 24.1 26.5 24.3 24.0 22.6 25.1 24.6 24.1 
At-risk-of-poverty-rate (before 
child-related transfers) 21.0 na 21.9 20.8 20.8 22.9 21.1 20.6 21.7 21.6 20.0 20.5 21.6 20.3 19.4 20.0 19.8 19.7 20.6 19.9 
CHILDREN (percentage)                     
At-risk-of-poverty-rate (total 
income) 24.5 na 24.5 21.9 23.5 29.2 23.3 23.8 24.5 26.3 20.8 23.9 25.4 24.0 20.9 24.2 22.6 22.3 23.5 24.1 
At-risk-of-poverty-rate (before 
transfers, include pensions) 33.1 na 35.5 28.6 32.6 45.5 33.7 31.1 33.7 43.0 30.4 29.9 34.2 41.2 30.3 31.2 31.6 38.0 32.2 30.1 
At-risk-of-poverty-rate (before  
ransfers, except pensions) 30.7 na 31.7 26.2 30.7 38.8 30.5 28.1 31.8 36.3 27.7 28.0 32.3 34.3 27.3 28.3 29.1 32.4 29.3 28.6 
At-risk-of-poverty-rate (before 
child-related transfers) 28.6 na 27.5 22.8 27.9 33.9 27.1 24.1 29.4 31.8 23.6 24.1 29.7 30.6 23.5 24.5 26.2 28.8 26.5 24.6 
Source: EU-SILC_ 2004-2008, cross-sectional data. Data weighted. 
 
 
